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Abstract
Predictive judicial analytics holds the promise of increasing efficiency and
fairness of law. Judicial analytics can assess extra-legal factors that influence
decisions. Behavioral anomalies in judicial decision-making offer an intuitive un-
derstanding of feature relevance, which can then be used for debiasing the law.
A conceptual distinction between inter-judge disparities in predictions and inter-
judge disparities in prediction accuracy suggests another normatively relevant
criterion with regards to fairness. Predictive analytics can also be used in the
first step of causal inference, where the features employed in the first step are
exogenous to the case. Machine learning thus offers an approach to assess bias in
the law and evaluate theories about the potential consequences of legal change.
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Predictive judicial analytics holds the promise of increasing efficiency and fairness
of law. Many talk of machine learning algorithms predicting decisions (Aletras et al.
2016) or even replacing judges (D’Amato 1976). But this article describes a set of
findings showing that the decisions are not pure and can reflect bias (conscious and
unconscious) and extra-legal factors such as time of day. This means that to predict
decisions we will have to model factors which really should have no place in the decision
making, so that accuracy is not always a good thing.
Consider a definition of justice as equal treatment before the law and equality based
on recognition of difference. We can imagine a set of covariates X that should lead to
the same prediction or predictability of outcomes Y = f(X)+ε; the X’s should improve
predictions. And, we can think of a set of W ’s that should not (y ⊥ W, var(ε) ⊥ W ).
We tend to think of X’s as mutable—as consequences of choices (a → X, a 9 W ),
and the W ’s as immutable, unrelated to one’s actions. These equations derive from
the control principle (Moulin 2004; Gurdal et al. 2013), the idea that we are morally
assessable only to the extent that what we are assessed for depends on factors under
our control. Two people ought not to be morally assessed differently if the only other
differences between them are due to factors beyond their control.
A highly predictive model would include the W . But, if we want to replace judges
we should do so with machines that do not exhibit the biases and foibles. Since many
think that highly accurate predictions relative to a large body of historic cases would
provide a good indication that judges could be replaced, this article highlights the need
to de-bias the predictions so the law could be applied without distortion by these extra-
legal factors, which are enshrined in the earlier decisions–a single landmark case can
overturn decades of decisions. Prediction is not a good measure of the accuracy of the
model to what the law should be, since it will need to reflect biases and prejudices that
ought to be excluded. Learning from large data can be used to identify these biases and
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prejudices. This article describes a number of findings indicating behavioral anomalies
in judicial decision-making, which offers an intuitive understanding of feature relevance.
Inter-judge disparities in predictions (Y = fj(X) + ε) is one salient example of a
normative criteria with regards to fairness. Inter-judge disparities in prediction accuracy
(Y = fj(X) + εj) is as another. Not all behavioral anomalies can be detected, so the
degree of susceptibility to unobserved behavioral anomalies would be captured by inter-
judge disparities in prediction accuracy. Early predictability is yet another normative
criteria with regards to fairness. If a judge can be predicted prior to observing the case
facts, one might worry about the use of snap or pre-determined judgements, or judicial
indifference. To put it differently, the preferences of judges over the legally relevant
covariates may affect the influence of irrelevant features. A judge could be said to have
weak preferences, meaning that there was a relatively low cost in departing from the
legally optimal outcome. In such cases of legal indifference, irrelevant factors can be
expected to have greater influence. Behavioral bias reveals when decision-makers are
indifferent. Disparities in prediction accuracy can be called, difference in indifference.
Besides alerting to possible biases, machine learning algorithms can be used to eval-
uate the effects of the decisions. Just as much legal research makes recommendations
(inputs) based on theories about the potential consequences of legal change, the pre-
dictions of decisions can be used for downstream analyses of causal evaluation of the
effects of decisions. The predictions would not be used to suggest a decision, but used
as inputs to increase efficiency and fairness of law. A causal inference framework is
presented from where predictive analytics is used in the first step, where the features
employed in prediction are exogenous to the case.
Counter-intuitively, a tension arises between between uncovering bias and distortion
to de-bias the law, and using predictions based on these biases to assess the consequences
of law. If the last century of American law was characterized by what Karl Polanyi
3
(1944) might call, “the great transformation1”, whereby American law was characterized
by a shift to a consequentialist mode of reasoning about the law and a focus on efficiency,
then judicial analytics might be the next step in this great transformation, to move from
theorizing about the consequences of law to measuring the consequences of law and a
focus on fairness.
Section 1 describes my findings on behavioral judging and judicial analytics. Section
2 discusses difference in judicial indifference. Section 3 shows how to measure causal
impacts of judicial precedent. Section 4 concludes.
1 Behavioral Judging and Judicial Analytics
This article begins with describing briefly findings from other articles, which the
reader can refer to for the theoretical and empirical details. These findings mostly
serve as scene setters for using behavioral anomalies to predict judicial decisions. I use
several exhibits from own work on the Circuit Courts, District Courts, the US Supreme
Court, the immigration courts, and a district attorney’s office in New Orleans. Using
machine learning to predict the legal decision raises the possibility of judicial analytics
to uncover the factors that affect judicial decisions.
For those articles, I have digitized all 380,000 cases and a million judge votes from
1891 in the Circuit Courts. I have engineered 2 billion N-grams of up to length 8 and 5
million citation edges across cases, collated 250 biographical features on 268 judges, and
linked this to the 5% random sample2 of over 400 hand-coded features and 6000 cases
hand-coded for meaning in 25 legal areas. I also utilize a data set on millions of criminal
1 After the great transformation, human economic mentalities were changed, and people became more
economically rational, behaving as neoclassical economic theory would predict (Polanyi 1944).
2 U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/auburndata.htm)
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sentencing decisions in US District Courts since 1992, linked to judge identity via FOIA-
request, and a digital corpus of their opinions since 1923. These data are linked to
publicly available Supreme Court datasets, US District docket datasets, geocoded judge
seats, biographies of judicial clerks, and administrative data from Administrative Office
of the US Courts (date of key milestones, e.g., oral arguments, when the last brief was
filed, etc.) for measuring priming of identity, peer effects, perfectionism, partisan ways
of persuasion, judicial innovation, and the genealogy of ideologies and schools of thought
in temporally and spatially disaggregated text.
I have also the universe of administrative data on 1 million refugee asylum and 15
million hearing sessions and their time of day across 50 courthouses and 20 years (with
randomly assigned judges) and hand-collected biographical data to study gambler’s
fallacy, implicit egoism, habit formation, racial contrast, mood, extraneous factors, and
time of day effects on judges’ normative commitments. I have a linked universe of
individuals in a federal prosecutor’s office over a decade with many stages of random
assignment, to measure, e.g., name letter effects, in-group bias, and the intersection of
heirarchy and race. I have also digitized the speech patterns in US Supreme Court oral
arguments since 1955 - longitudinal data on speech intonation (linguistic turns) are rare.
The data are linked to oral advocates’ biographies, faces, clipped identical introductory
sentences, and ratings of their traits. The data are used to test labor market treatment
of mutable characteristics and persuasion, and mimicry between lawyers and Justices
and among Justices over time using high-dimensional econometrics.
These data serve as a natural laboratory to study normative judgments using the
tools of machine learning and causal inference. Each setting offers unique features to
study behavioral judging (see Tab. 1). The federal courts offer a setting to study the
causal effects of common law precedent. The various possible anomalies explored are
suggested by theories, mainly in economics and psychology, which are discussed in the
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Circuit District SCOTUS Asylum New Orleans DA
Priming Mood Masculinity Gambler’s Fallacy Implicit Egoism
Deontological Interpellation Mimicry Snap Judgments Heirarchy
Economics Economics Visual cues Mood/Time Judge v. Prosecutor
Table 1: Influences on Judicial Decisions
original papers and reports consolidated here.
Berdejo and Chen (2017) and ? document how Circuit Court judges’ behavior varies
over the Presidential election cycle. In particular, dissents (2-1 decisions) systematically
increase before a Presidential election as shown in Fig. 1. This figure plots the monthly
dissent rate relative to the month after the election. The solid line indicates the point
estimates and the dotted lines the confidence intervals.
To get a sense of the magnitude, we might expect that on a three-judge panel, when
you have both Democrats and Republicans appointees being assigned to the same panel,
dissents are more likely. Indeed, as Tab. 2 shows, cases are 1.5 percentage points more
likely to have a dissent. However, when it is the quarter before the election, there
is an additional 5-6 percentage points greater likelihood in having a dissent. These
effects are quite large, relative to the average rate of dissent, which is 8%. The table
presents a linear regression of the probability of a dissent on a set of dummy indicators
for each quarter prior to an election (the omitted quarter is the one after an election).
The different columns present different sets of additional controls and a probit model
instead of a linear probability model.
Electoral cycles can be seen not only in dissent, but also in how judges vote. The 5%
sample codes by hand each vote as conservative or liberal. Fig. 2 shows that Democrats
do vote more liberally relative to Republicans, but the correlation increases before the
Presidential election. This figure is based on a regression of the vote valence on a set
of dummy indicators and their interaction between party of appointment. The figure
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Figure 1: Electoral Cycles Among U.S. Courts of Appeals Judges
Source: Berdejo and Chen (2017)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Divided	  (DRR	  or	  RDD) 0.0157 0.0153 0.114 0.111
[0.00452]*** [0.00451]*** [0.0327]*** [0.0328]***
Quartertoelect	  =	  1 0.0637 0.0527 0.448 0.377 0.0113 0.00847 0.0962 0.0724
[0.0123]*** [0.0132]*** [0.0857]*** [0.0936]*** [0.00323]*** [0.00337]** [0.0286]*** [0.0303]**
Quartertoelect	  =	  2 0.0347 0.0255 0.284 0.224 0.00785 0.00474 0.0705 0.0441
[0.0121]*** [0.0138]* [0.0960]*** [0.105]** [0.00292]*** [0.00318] [0.0263]*** [0.0285]
Quartertoelect	  =	  3 0.0325 0.0302 0.270 0.256 0.00782 0.00445 0.0704 0.0414
[0.0123]*** [0.0134]** [0.0982]*** [0.103]** [0.00318]** [0.00331] [0.0284]** [0.0295]
Quartertoelect	  =	  4 0.00581 0.00578 0.0444 0.0481 0.00153 0.00158 0.0138 0.0153
[0.0111] [0.0111] [0.0963] [0.0962] [0.00399] [0.00368] [0.0365] [0.0333]
Quartertoelect	  =	  5 0.0209 0.0102 0.170 0.101 0.00747 0.00454 0.0684 0.0449
[0.0152] [0.0156] [0.119] [0.122] [0.00465] [0.00450] [0.0422] [0.0407]
Quartertoelect	  =	  6 0.0120 0.00302 0.0970 0.0418 0.00496 0.00185 0.0451 0.0196
[0.0141] [0.0155] [0.114] [0.118] [0.00460] [0.00455] [0.0419] [0.0407]
Quartertoelect	  =	  7 0.0226 0.0194 0.178 0.159 0.0000166 -­‐0.00330 -­‐0.000524 -­‐0.0280
[0.0141] [0.0150] [0.111] [0.113] [0.00470] [0.00448] [0.0431] [0.0403]
Quartertoelect	  =	  8 0.00772 0.00859 0.0521 0.0644 0.00519 0.00528 0.0455 0.0464
[0.0141] [0.0141] [0.107] [0.106] [0.00446] [0.00415] [0.0405] [0.0370]
Quartertoelect	  =	  9 -­‐0.0115 -­‐0.0218 -­‐0.0717 -­‐0.138 0.0120 0.00891 0.103 0.0759
[0.0155] [0.0157] [0.112] [0.114] [0.00500]** [0.00490]* [0.0443]** [0.0427]*
Quartertoelect	  =	  10 -­‐0.0114 -­‐0.0193 -­‐0.0779 -­‐0.128 0.00647 0.00326 0.0581 0.0301
[0.0160] [0.0174] [0.115] [0.122] [0.00482] [0.00490] [0.0434] [0.0430]
Quartertoelect	  =	  11 0.000311 -­‐0.00142 0.00509 -­‐0.00295 0.00706 0.00364 0.0623 0.0323
[0.0162] [0.0171] [0.116] [0.118] [0.00499] [0.00497] [0.0450] [0.0438]
Quartertoelect	  =	  12 -­‐0.0102 -­‐0.00912 -­‐0.0628 -­‐0.0521 -­‐0.00102 -­‐0.00117 -­‐0.0101 -­‐0.0100
[0.0128] [0.0129] [0.0900] [0.0903] [0.00382] [0.00351] [0.0336] [0.0302]
Quartertoelect	  =	  13 0.00115 -­‐0.0101 0.00433 -­‐0.0726 0.00450 0.00141 0.0347 0.00970
[0.0148] [0.0148] [0.0961] [0.0980] [0.00385] [0.00374] [0.0330] [0.0316]
Quartertoelect	  =	  14 -­‐0.0157 -­‐0.0243 -­‐0.105 -­‐0.157 0.000920 -­‐0.00234 0.00590 -­‐0.0210
[0.0134] [0.0151] [0.0940] [0.103] [0.00382] [0.00391] [0.0330] [0.0329]
Quartertoelect	  =	  15 -­‐0.0176 -­‐0.0194 -­‐0.121 -­‐0.131 -­‐0.000372 -­‐0.00386 -­‐0.00561 -­‐0.0348
[0.0117] [0.0127] [0.0788] [0.0832] [0.00391] [0.00377] [0.0335] [0.0312]
Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
Observations 18686 18686 18686 18686 263388 263388 263388 263388
R-­‐squared 0.019 0.022 0.012 0.013
Table	  1:	  Electoral	  Cycles	  in	  Dissents
Notes:	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  brackets	  (*	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%).	  	  Data	  in	  columns	  (1)-­‐(4)	  come	  from	  U.S.	  Courts	  of	  Appeals	  Database	  (1925-­‐2002)	  
and	  data	  in	  columns	  (5)-­‐(8)	  come	  from	  our	  100%	  data	  collection	  from	  1950-­‐2007.	  Standard	  errors	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  quarter-­‐year	  level.	  	  The	  outcome	  variable	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  
to	  1	  if	  there	  was	  a	  dissenting	  opinion	  in	  the	  case.	  The	  explanatory	  variables	  of	  interest	  are	  dummy	  variables	  indicating	  the	  number	  of	  quarters	  remaining	  before	  the	  presidential	  election	  
(16	  quarters	  to	  the	  election	  is	  the	  omitted	  dummy	  variable)	  and	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  panel	  deciding	  the	  case	  was	  divided	  along	  ideological	  lines.	  	  All	  regressions	  include	  year	  
fixed	  effects	  and	  circuit	  fixed	  effects.	  	  Columns	  (2)	  and	  (4)	  include	  legal	  issues	  fixed	  effects	  and	  quarter	  fixed	  effects.	  	  Columns	  (6)	  and	  (8)	  include	  quarter	  fixed	  effects.
Ordinary	  Least	  Squares ProbitProbit Ordinary	  Least	  Squares
Dissent	  (2-­‐1	  Decision)	  with	  or	  without	  Dissenting	  Opinion Dissent	  (2-­‐1	  Decision)	  with	  Dissenting	  Opinion
Table 2: Electoral Cycles Among U.S. Courts of Appeals Judges (regression)
Source: Berdejo and Chen (2017)
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Figure 2: Electoral Cycles in Partisan Voting
Source: Berdejo and Chen (2017)
8
Code: (+1	  vs.	  0/-­‐1) (+1/0	  vs.	  -­‐1)
Ordinary	  Least	  Squares Ordered	  Probit Probit Probit
Panel	  A:	  All	  Judges (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lastquarter -­‐0.0337 -­‐0.0507 -­‐0.0528 -­‐0.0472
[0.0348] [0.0497] [0.0527] [0.0571]
Appointed	  by	  Democrat 0.0707 0.0988 0.100 0.0993
[0.00820]*** [0.0115]*** [0.0119]*** [0.0127]***
Appointed	  by	  Democrat 0.0707 0.0955 0.113 0.0867
	  	  *	  Lastquarter [0.0367]* [0.0497]* [0.0577]** [0.0488]*
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 56058 56058 56058 56058
R-­‐squared 0.087
Panel	  B:	  Politically	  Unified	  Panels	  (DDD	  or	  RRR)
Lastquarter -­‐0.194 -­‐0.282 -­‐0.225 -­‐0.325
[0.105]* [0.154]* [0.164] [0.161]**
Appointed	  by	  Democrat 0.163 0.232 0.217 0.247
[0.0303]*** [0.0423]*** [0.0468]*** [0.0447]***
Appointed	  by	  Democrat 0.208 0.288 0.237 0.345
	  	  *	  Lastquarter [0.126]* [0.178] [0.193] [0.183]*
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 5659 5659 5659 5659
R-­‐squared 0.100
Affirm Reverse Reverse	  and	  Remand Reverse	  No	  Remand
Lastquarter -­‐0.0515 0.0414 0.0503 -­‐0.00489
[0.0240]** [0.0163]** [0.0218]** [0.0125]
Controls Y Y Y Y
Observations 18686 18686 18686 18686
R-­‐squared 0.054 0.024 0.036 0.016
Ordinary	  Least	  Squares
Table	  3:	  Electoral	  Cycles	  in	  the	  Influence	  of	  Party	  of	  Appointment	  on	  Judges'	  Votes	  and	  Case	  Outcomes
Notes:	  Robust	  and	  clustered	  standard	  errors	  in	  brackets	  (*	  significant	  at	  10%;	  **	  significant	  at	  5%;	  ***	  significant	  at	  1%).	  	  Panel	  A:	  Vote-­‐
level	  regression.	  	  OLS	  standard	  errors	  are	  double-­‐clustered	  at	  the	  quarter-­‐year	  and	  case	  level;	  probit	  and	  ordered	  probit	  standard	  
errors	  are	  clustered	  at	  the	  quarter-­‐year	  level.	  	  The	  outcome	  variable	  is	  Liberal	  Vote,	  which	  is	  coded	  as	  1	  for	  liberal,	  0	  for	  mixed	  or	  not	  
applicable,	  and	  -­‐1	  for	  conservative.	  	  The	  explanatory	  variables	  of	  interest	  are	  a	  dummy	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  the	  case	  was	  
decided	  in	  the	  quarter	  immediately	  preceding	  a	  presidential	  election,	  a	  dummy	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  the	  judge	  was	  appointed	  by	  
a	  Democratic	  President	  and	  an	  interaction	  between	  these	  two	  variables.	  	  Regressions	  include	  quarter-­‐to-­‐election	  fixed	  effects,	  circuit	  
fixed	  effects,	  legal	  issues	  fixed	  effects,	  year	  fixed	  effects,	  quarter	  fixed	  effects,	  and	  a	  dummy	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  the	  panel	  is	  
divided.	  	  Panel	  B:	  Case-­‐level	  regression.	  	  The	  outcome	  variable	  is	  Liberal	  Precedent.	  	  Standard	  errors	  clustered	  at	  the	  quarter-­‐year	  level.	  	  
The	  explanatory	  variables	  of	  interest	  are	  a	  dummy	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  the	  case	  was	  decided	  in	  the	  quarter	  immediately	  
preceding	  a	  presidential	  election,	  a	  dummy	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  all	  three	  members	  of	  the	  panel	  were	  appointed	  by	  a	  
Democratic	  President	  and	  an	  interaction	  between	  these	  two	  variables.	  	  Control	  variables	  same	  as	  in	  Panel	  A.	  	  Panel	  C:	  Case-­‐level	  
regression.	  	  Robust	  standard	  errors,	  clustered	  at	  the	  quarter-­‐year	  level.	  In	  column	  (1)	  the	  outcome	  variable	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  
to	  1	  if	  the	  case	  affirmed	  the	  decision	  being	  reviewed;	  while	  the	  outcome	  variable	  in	  column	  (2)	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  
case	  reversed	  the	  decision	  being	  reviewed;	  the	  outcome	  in	  column	  (3)	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  court	  requested	  the	  lower	  
court	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  (perhaps	  with	  a	  new	  trial);	  the	  outcome	  in	  column	  (4)	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  court	  determined	  the	  final	  
outcome	  of	  the	  litigants	  in	  the	  original	  case.	  	  The	  explanatory	  variables	  of	  interest	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  a	  case	  was	  decided	  
in	  the	  quarter	  immediately	  preceding	  a	  presidential	  election.	  	  Controls	  are	  quarter-­‐to-­‐election	  fixed	  effects,	  year	  fixed	  effects,	  circuit	  
fixed	  effects	  and	  legal	  issues	  fixed	  effects.	  
Liberal	  Precedent
Liberal	  Vote
Panel	  C:	  Electoral	  Cycles	  in	  the	  Affirmations	  and	  Reversals	  of	  Lower	  Courts
(+1/0/-­‐1)
Table 3: Impact on Precedent
Source: Berdejo and Chen (2017)
plots the coefficients of the interaction terms.
Electoral cycles also appear in legal precedent. Restricting to the sample of cases
decided by unified panels (panels composed of three Republicans or three Democrats),
Tab. 3 shows there is an increas in the rrelation between the pa y of appointment
and the valence of the precedent. This table presents a regression of the vote valence on
the party of appointment interacted with a dummy indicator for the quarter before an
electio . If we think that precedent dictating a liberal or conservative outcome should
be equally likely to appear for the different types of panels, then this r ul would
suggest that the common law is being affected by these electoral cycles.
The impact of Presidential elections is further supported by Tab. 4, which shows
that the Circuit Courts are also changing how they affirm or reverse the District Courts.
This table presents a regression of the affirm or reverse decision on the quarter before
an election including the controls listed.
We have seen that presidential elections polarize federal appellate judges to increase
dissent, partisanship of precedent, and reverse lower courts. ? documents polarizing
effects that vary by intensity of elections across states, within judges, and over the
electoral season. Within the timeline of a case, the electoral cycle only appears using
the publication date, consistent with a transient priming mechanism. The effect appears
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(1) (2)
Affirm Reverse
Mean of dep. var. 0.568 0.269
Last Quarter -0.0588** 0.0519***
(0.0251) (0.0166)
Year FE Yes Yes
Circuit FE Yes Yes
Season FE Yes Yes
Legal Issue FE Yes Yes
Divided (RDD or DRR) FE Yes Yes
Quarter-to-Election FE Yes Yes
Observations 18686 18686
R-squared 0.054 0.025
Table 4: Electoral Cycles in Treatment of Lower Courts
Source: Berdejo and Chen (2017)
largest on cases involving economic activity, a topic made salient during the election
season. If elections spur partisan identities, during a period of national reconciliation,
we would expect the opposite. Fig. 3 shows that judges are less likely to dissent. This
figure plots the mean dissent rate for each year. The vertical bars indicate the official
start and end dates of wars.
In a second judicial anomaly, I explore the gambler’s fallacy, a well-known tendency
for individuals to misunderstand random processes. In a series of coin flips, they think
that there is a relative rapid alternation between heads and tails. But a real sequence of
coin flips can reflect streaks of 1’s and streaks of 0’s. In other words, any two sequences
will be equally likely, but judges may think a sequence like 0101001011001010100110100
is more likely than a sequence like 0101011111011000001001101. A judge granting
asylum may worry about being too lenient if s/he grants too many decisions in a row
or being too harsh if s/he denies too many in a row. Such a judge might actively,
negatively autocorrelate. Indeed, if the previous decision was to grant asylum, the
next decision is 1-2 percentage points less likely to grant asylum. Tab. 5 presents a
regression of the current decision on the lag decision including the controls listed. This
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Table 5: Gambler’s Fallacy in Asylum Decisions
Source: Chen et al. (2016b)
effect is also observed in other situations where decision-makers make judgments, like
with loan officers and baseball umpires (Chen et al. 2016b).
Mental accounting is the idea that we have mental categories. We have money for
books or money for restaurants. When it comes to judges making sentencing decisions,
they may have a category for sentencing months and one for sentencing days. Chen
and Philippe (2017) finds that when it is the defendant’s birthday, judges round down
in the number of sentencing days. Fig. 4 plots the cumulative distribution function of
non-zero days for sentences that occur on the defendant’s birthday and for those that
do not.
This effect is quite substantial and is only on the day of the birthday, not for days
before or after, and it is not observed for sentencing months. Fig. 5 presents the means
for the days before and after a birthday and shows no effect on the months component
of sentences.
For French courts, where the defendants are not always present, the birthday effect
is only observed when the defendant is present. Fig. 6 presents the means for the days
before and after a birthday for defendants who are present and for those who are not
12
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Figure 5: Judicial Leniency on Defendant Birthdays in District Courts
Source: Chen and Philippe (2017)
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Figure 6: Judicial Leniency on Defendant Birthdays in French Courts
Source: Chen and Philippe (2017)
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Figure 7: Mood in Asylum and District Courts
Source: Chen (2017)
present. The norm in France is to appear at trial.
A recent study by Eren and Mocan (2018) finds that Louisiana judges respond to
the Louisiana football team winning or losing. Fig. 7 shows the same effect in asylum
courts and district courts with a much larger sample. The lines are local polynomials
estimated for wins and for losses separately, the shaded area indicate the confidence
interval, and the dots are jittered plots of the underlying data.
Notably, the effect in asylum courts comes entirely when the lawyer is not present.
Tab. 6 presents a regression with an interaction between the lawyer being present and
14
Dependent variable Granted Asylum
(1) (2)
Yesterday’s NFL Win 0.037** 0.037**
(0.014) (0.014)
Yesterday’s NFL Win X -0.032* -0.032*
Lawyer (0.017) (0.017)
Lawyer 0.186*** 0.186***
(0.022) (0.022)
JudgeXCity Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time control City-specific trends City-specific trends
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Season Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Applicant controls Yes Yes
N 22282 22282
R2 0.30 0.30
Clustering City City+Judge
Number of clusters 56x340 56x340
Table 6: Effect of NFL Outcomes by Lawyer Representation
Source: Chen (2017)
whether the NFL football game resulted in a win or loss with the controls listed. The
first coefficient indicates that a win increases the chances of an asylum grant by 3.7
percentage points relative to when there is a loss, but if there is a lawyer present, the
effect essentially disappears.
So with the Supreme Court, I have been working with the oral arguments in two
different ways. First, I have been clipping the first sentence, which is identical for all
the lawyers – “Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court” – and asked third-party
raters to rate the voices on attractiveness, masculinity, intelligence, and so on. Fig. 8
shows a sample questionnaire used for the 1,901 U.S. Supreme Court oral arguments
between 1999 and 2013.
Fig. 9 shows that perceived masculinity predicts court outcomes. Males are more
15
Figure 8: Questionnaire
Source: Chen et al. (2017a, 2016a)
likely to win when they are perceived as less masculine. This figure presents a binscatter
where each dot presents the mean x- and y-value for every 5% of the data along the
x-axis. The first plot shows the overall relationship, which is then broken by the party
of the judge. The line is a linear regression fit. The negative correlation between
masculinity and win rates appears to be due to two mechanisms. First, the votes of
Democrats and not Republicans are negatively associated with perceived masculinity.
Second, the relationship seems due to industry. Fig. 10 shows that the correlation
is stronger in more masculine industries. Each line or set of dots is presenting the
relationship for quartiles of industry by masculinity rating. The category for industry
comes the hand-labeled category of the parties involved in the litigation. We concep-
tualize three layers of actors: the judges, the lawyers, and the law firms who select the
lawyers. A law firm that misperceives the masculine lawyer as being more likely to win
or, prefers masculine lawyers for non-economic reasons, may choose more masculine
16
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lawyers at the cost of winning. The preference for more masculine lawyers may be
stronger in more masculine industries.
I also align the audio with the text so we can extract the way each vowel is spoken to
investigate a number of behavioral hypotheses. For example, it turns out that linguistic
convergence is predictive of how judge decide (Chen and Yu 2016). Everyone also
converges, lawyers to judges and judges to lawyers. This convergence can also be called
mimicry.
In psychology, people have documented that people respond differently when the
first initial of their name is shown in the lab. This method related to implicit egoism
has been used in many different experiments. In this setting, the defendants and the
judges’ names are available, and Fig. 11 shows that when the first initials match, there’s
an effect of matching on first initials on sentencing decisions. This figure presents the
density of sentences for defendants whose first initial matches the first initial of the
judge. It overlays the density of sentences for defendants whose first initials do not
match the first initial of the judge. Fewer sentences of 0 and 1 years are assigned when
the first initials match.
What this amounts to is 8% longer sentences when judges match on first initials
17
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with the defendant. The effect is consistent with self-image motivations to create social
distance from negatively-valenced targets perceived to be associated with the self. The
effects are larger for black defendants classified (by police) as “Negro” rather than
“Black”. The first initial effect replicates for the last name, as does the difference by
racial label. These results are robust to adjusting for controls including skin, hair, and
eye color. Name letter effects appear for roughly all judges and amplify when the first
and second letter of the name match, when the full name matches, or when the name
letter is rare.
2 Machine Learning and Judicial Indifference
A prominent American jurist, Jerome Frank, proposed that “uniquely individual
factors often are more important causes of judgments than anything which could be
described as political, economic, or moral biases” (Hutcheson, Jr. 1929; Frank 1930
[2009])). This view is often caricatured as “what the judge had for breakfast” (Schauer
2009). The previous section has shown a collection of judicial anomalies, but these
are findings using only data that already exists. Since a judge can be influenced by
many factors unobserved to the statistician, an open question is how to assess the other
unobserved influences in aggregate. Together, the psychological, political, economic,
and moral biases that lead decisions of one judge to differ from another may be captured
in unpredictability, the ε term in the introduction’s motivating equation. Revealed
preference indifference is observed when irrelevant factors have greater influence, when
a judge could be said to have weak preferences over the legally relevant covariates, such
as the facts of the case. Another way to benchmark revealed preference indifference is
through early predictability, prior to the judge hearing the case.
To illustrate, let me turn to the asylum courts where I have the administrative
universe since 1981. This data comprise half a million asylum decisions across 336
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hearing locations and 441 judges. These are high stakes decisions whether to deny
asylum, which usually results in deportation. The applicant for asylum reasonably fears
imprisonment, torture, or death if forced to return to their home country. The average
grant rate is about 35%. Chen et al. (2017b) shows that using data only available
up to the decision date, you can achieve 80% predictive accuracy. It is predominately
driven by trend features and judge characteristics, things that you might wonder if they
are unfair, and about one-third is driven by case information, news events, and court
information. Then we use only the data available to the case opening and we show that
you can achieve 78% accuracy, which raises questions about snap judgments, heuristics,
or pre-determined judgments playing a role in how judges decide.
Fig. 12 shows some descriptive statistics. Judges are more lenient before lunch and
towards the end of the day. So this is different in some ways from the Israeli parole
article, but otherwise it is consistent in that there are time effects (Danziger et al.
2011). The lower left of this figure shows that there is a U-shape relationship with
family size, and the lower right shows that defensive cases are less likely to be granted
– defensive cases are those where the applicant has been caught, rather than applying
for an extension to stay.
Fig. 13 shows that judges are more lenient with good weather rather than extreme
weather and more lenient with a genocide news indicator. The bottom part shows
strong trend factors both within the court on the left and over time on the right. These
features are motivated by prior research. For example, Chen (2017) and Heyes and
Saberian (2018) also report an effect of temperature and Ramji-Nogales et al. (2007)
reports on “refugee roulette”, where the randomly assigned judge has a strong effect on
the final decision.
What Chen and Eagel (2017) does is to train a parameter set on all cases up to
the preceding December 31st, and it find that random forest performs best. There is a
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Figure 12: Predictability of Asylum Decisions (I)
Source: Chen and Eagel (2017)
Figure 13: Predictability of Asylum Decisions (II)
Source: Chen and Eagel (2017)
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Figure 14: Predictability of Asylum Decisions
Source: Chen and Eagel (2017)
Figure 15: Predictability of Asylum Decisions
Source: Chen and Eagel (2017)
substantial performance dip around the mid-2000s on the test set, as shown in Fig. 14.
It turns out, with error analysis, 40% of the misclassifications come from Congo
applicants in one year of city court (and the second Congo war began in 1998 and
ended in 2003), as shown in Fig. 15.
Chen et al. (2017b) makes a conceptual distinction between inter-judge disparities
in 1) predictions vs. 2) prediction accuracy. If case outcomes could be completely
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Model Accuracy ROC AUC
Judge ID 0.71 0.74
Judge ID & Nationality 0.76 0.82
Judge ID & Opening Date 0.73 0.77
Judge ID & Nationality & Opening Date 0.78 0.84
Full model at case completion 0.82 0.88
Table 7: Early Predictability of Asylum Decisions
predicted after a particular judge is assigned, but prior to judicial inquiry, that would
indicate that judges did not take into account any non-coded differences between cases.
Now, to be sure, there may be cases in which country and date of application should
completely determine outcomes, for example, during violent conflict. But significant
inter-judge disparities in predictability would suggest that this understanding of country
circumstances does not apply to all judges. Indeed, we find that some judges are
highly predictable, always granting or always rejecting, which raises the question of
snap judgements or stereotypes–these playing a greater role in decision-making under
time pressure and distraction, features that have been articulated to characterize the
immigration courts. What we do is to use a minimal set of characteristics: date,
nationality, judge, and court (these are, in turn, dummy variables, and motivate using
a random forest).
With judge identity we achieve 70% predictive accuracy, and with nationality it is
76% accuracy. Including the opening date, we go from 76% to 78% percent accuracy.
This suggests that variation over time has had little additional impact on the outcome
of adjudications. In comparison, with the full model of case completion, we get 82%
accuracy. Tab. 7 reports the accuracy and ROC AUC statistics for the different models.
Figure 16 shows that judges with low and high grant rates are more predictable.
Each dot represents a judge and the circle size corresponds to the number of cases heard
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Figure 16: Early Predictability of Asylum Decisions by Judge
Source: Chen et al. (2017b)
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Figure 17: Early Predictability of Asylum Decisions and Number of Hearings
Source: Chen et al. (2017b)
by the judge.
We might wonder, maybe the judges with a middle-grant rate are simply flipping a
coin, but that is not the case. Fig. 17 shows that middle-grant rate judges hold more
hearing sessions than the judges who rarely grant asylum. The color represents the
average number of hearing sessions per case.
We may also wonder about the judges that are highly predictable with low or high
grant rates–maybe both sides are equally using heuristics. But we see that the judges
with higher grant rates are having more hearing sessions on average. It seems that
these judges are collecting more information to potentially justify their decisions. Less
predictable judges are not simply flipping a coin. Hearing sessions are greater for less
predictable judges and for judges with higher grant rates.
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3 Measuring the Consequences of Legal Precedent
Turning from “what affects judicial decisions” to the question of “what are the effects
of judicial decisions”, this section builds on the findings documented in the previous two
sections and also on the literature documenting the effects of judge politics, race, and
gender (Schanzenbach 2005; Bushway and Piehl 2001; Mustard 2001; Steffensmeier and
Demuth 2000; Albonetti 1997; Klein et al. 1978; Humphrey and Fogarty 1987; Thomson
and Zingraff 1981; Abrams et al. 2012; Boyd et al. 2010; Shayo and Zussman 2011). A
frequent response to findings of extra-legal influences is to debias rulings, perhaps by
nudges or through the use of tools from artificial intelligence. This section shows how
tools from causal inference can leverage the influence of extra-legal factors to examine
the consequences of judicial decisions. Knowledge of these consequences, in turn, may
make judges less indifferent to their rulings.
Legal scholars and judges have long made arguments about laws and regulations
and justified their arguments with theories about the effects of these legal rules. A
particularly challenging dimension of studying the effects of legal rules is that many
other aspects of society are correlated with the presence of legal rules, so it is difficult
to determine cause or effect. There are judges on the right, such as Judge Richard
Posner, who argue that understanding the empirical consequences of judicial decisions
is important so that judges can make better cost-benefit utilitarian analyses (Posner
1998). There are judges on the left, such as Justice Stephen Breyer, who also argue
that understanding the consequences of their decisions is important so judges can make
decisions that accord with the democratic will of the people (Breyer 2006).3 Methods
to evaluate the impact of court-made law may help judges who are interested in the
3 Judge Richard Posner has lamented that, “[judicial] opinions lack the empirical support that is crucial
to sound constitutional adjudication” (Posner 1998); similarly Justice Breyer remarked, “I believe
that a[n] interpretive approach that undervalues consequences, by undervaluing related constitutional
objectives, exacts a constitutional price that is too high” (Breyer 2006).
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broader empirical consequences of their decisions.
Consider, for example, a famous Supreme Court case, Kelo v. City of New London
(2005), where the judges were debating whether to allow government expropriation
of private land. The case held that a transfer of private property to another private
entity for the purpose of economic development satisfies the public use requirement.
The judges debated whether eminent domain would spur economic growth or increase
income equality. Justice Ginsburg and Thomas in their dissents argued that taking
land from the poor on behalf of a large pharmaceutical company (Pfizer) amounted to
“Reverse Robin Hood.” In response to (empirical) policy questions like this, to date,
judges speculate on the potential effects of their decisions rather than relying on hard
data.
There are three empirical challenges to identifying causal effects. First, legal deci-
sions are not random. They are endogenous to the societal trends that they potentially
effect. So how do we determine between cause and effect? Second, there’s substantial
cross-fertilization between different legal areas. Roe v. Wade (1973) was argued from
the part of the law that used to govern government regulation of contracts.4 If many
legal areas are changing at the same time, how do we know what is the causal effect of
one legal area as opposed to another that can be changing at the same time. Third,
there’s selection of cases into the courts (Priest and Klein 1984). If the precedent is very
strong and in favor of the plaintiff, then weaker cases on the merits may enter into the
courts. Plaintiff win rates would reveal little or no information about the underlying
strength of precedent.
Randomized control trials has also been gaining prominence in economics to evaluate
the effects of policies. In law, we cannot randomize judicial decisions, since doing so
4 Roe v. Wade extended the right of privacy under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Even though the Due Process Clause was previously interpreted as precluding government interference
in freedom of contract (see, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897)), it was then interpreted as precluding
interference in a woman’s decision to have an abortion.
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 Figure 18: Map of US Federal Courts
would undermine the notion of justice and equal treatment before the law, but judges are
randomly assigned and there is substantial variation in how they decide–their habits or
legal philosophies. For example, Democrats and Republicans decide differently, and this
generates a retrospective clinical trial. It was not until a little over ten years ago when
the first article came out that used the random assignment of defendants to harsher or
more lenient judges to look at the subsequent outcomes of these defendants over time
(Kling 2006). What we can do, then, is to look at the subseqential precedential impacts
because the US is a common law system where the case precedent is binding within the
Circuits (indicated by the colors in Fig. 18). 98% of the Circuit Court decisions are
final. Judges are randomly assigned repeatedly to panels of three, drawn from a pool
of 8 to 40 life-tenured judges, who have significant discretion. Their characteristics
predict their decisions. Medicine used to also theorize about the effects of medical
inventions, but, methods (clinical trials) were developed to evaluate the causal effects
of interventions.
More formally, we model the effects of law at the circuit-year (or state-year) level,
Lawct, on outcome Yict for individual i in circuit c at year t. The individual could be
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a person, county, or state – anything that can be aggregated to the circuit level. The
second-stage estimating equation is
Yict = β0 + β1Lawct + β21[Mct > 0] + β3Si + β4Tt + β5Xict + β6Wct + εict. (1)
The main coefficient of interest is β1 on Lawct, a measure of the policy direction of
decisions issued in Circuit c at year t. For example, it could be the proportion of
“pro-plaintiff” decisions, which is the language we will use here. Mct is the number
of cases, Si includes state fixed effects, Tt includes time fixed effects, Xict includes
state characteristics (such as GDP, population, or state time trends) or individual
characteristics (such as gender, age, race, or college attendance), and Wct includes
characteristics of the pool of judges available to be assigned.
Let Nct be the number of pro-plaintiff judges assigned to policy-relevant cases. If a
circuit-year has a higher fraction of pro-plaintiff judges (Nct/Mct) assigned, the prece-
dent for that year will be that much more pro-plaintiff. The moment condition for
causal inference is E[(Nct/Mct−E(Nct/Mct))εict] = 0, where E(Nct/Mct) is the expected
proportion of judges who tend to be pro-plaintiff.
The first stage equation is
Lawct = γ0 + γ1Zct + γ21[Mct > 0] + γ3Si + γ4Tt + γ5Xict + γ6Wct + ηict (2)
where the terms have been defined as above, and Zct includes the instruments selected
for post-Lasso 2SLS. Estimates for ~γ and ~β are estimated using optimal GMM. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by circuit-year, since randomization at the circuit-year level
addresses serial correlation at the circuit level (Barrios et al. 2012).
Research at the intersection of machine learning and causal inference is moving
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quickly. One aim of the technology described will be to explicitly allow for future
improvements, such that the “engine” can be swapped out, without too much difficulty.
For example, recent advances in machine learning and econometrics allow automating
the causal analysis of heterogenous impacts of judicial decisions. Other advances bring
deep learning (neural nets) to high-dimensional instrumental variables (such as text),
that we can employ to predict the impact of judges’ decisions on populations.
To illustrate the intuition for our natural experiment, consider Fig. 19. The solid
black line is the expected number of Democratic appointees in each seat, which varies
systematically over time. The President appoints the judges and the appointments
would be correlated with social trends. But the jagged blue line–the actual number
of Democratic appointees per seat–varies idiosyncratically around the black line. This
idiosyncratic random variation, the jagged blue line, is what we can use to solve the
three issues mentioned earlier. First, the randomness would not be caused by future
trends. Second, the random variation in one legal area will not be correlated with
the random variation in another legal area, which deals with the omitted variables
problem. And third, because it is a common law setting, where the precedent is being
created through these decisions, the jagged blue line identifies exogenous variation in
legal precedent.
The data available to do this kind of analysis comes from hard work from many legal
scholars to hand collect cases across a number of different legal areas in civil rights, in
property, in constitutional law, to name just a few (Sunstein et al. 2004). Tab. 8
lists a few. The data is then merged with judge biographies, both from the Federal
Judiciary Center as well as separate data collection from newspaper articles (Chen and
Yeh 2014a).
The correlations between judge biographies and decisions are intuitive. The left
side of Fig. 20 illustrates what happens with the Establishment Clause (separation
30
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Figure 19: Judicial Composition and Random Assignment
Source: Chen et al. (2014)
Civil Rights Property Constitutional Constitutional
sexual harassment eminent domain free speech abortion
affirmative action corporate veil piercing campaign finance Establishment Clause
sex discrimination contracts First Amendment Free Exercise Clause
Title VII environmental protection Eleventh Amendment capital punishment
desegregation NEPA standing criminal appeals
gay rights punitive damages federalism
disability rights National Labor Review Board FCC
Table 8: Case categories
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Figure 20: Effect of Judge Biographies on Decisions
Source: Ash and Chen (2017)
of church and state). This figure plots a local polynomial of the relationship between
judicial composition and church-state separation decisions. The shaded areas indicate
the confidence intervals. When there are more judges from a minority religion, the
more likely they vote to keep church and state separate. The left figure plots the actual
Jewish appointees per seat (i.e., the actual composition of the panels assigned to the
cases). Whereas on the right, the expected Jewish appointees per seat is not correlated
with the precedent (i.e., the expected composition of the panels assigned to the cases).
In an article with econometricians, we show that one does not have to just rely one
judicial biographical characteristic (Belloni et al. 2012). There are many characteristics
that can be used in a machine learning step to predict the legal decision, as long as
the features that are used are all exogenous–that is, from random variation. Moreover,
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the random variation need not be restricted to biography. It can come from the prior
texts or citations by a judge. It can come from extra-legal factors exogenous to the
case. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the collection of judicial anomalies in Section 1 can
be used to measure the causal effects of judicial precedent.
After creating the predictions of decisions, we can look at the effects of the laws on
outcomes. For example, Fig. 21 is looking at the effects of pro-choice abortion decisions
on state regulations, an index of regulations requiring mandatory delay, banning use
of Medicare payments to fund abortion, and requiring parental notification. The solid
line indicates the point estimates and the dotted lines the confidence intervals. We can
see with a pro-choice abortion decision, states are less likely to have these restrictive
laws. It is immediately observed after one year, and the pro-choice decision causes an
18% smaller likelihood in each of the regulations in each of the states. Some of this
is probably mechanical since the precedent can also be arbitrated over that particular
state regulation, but the magnitude would suggest there are also precedential effects.
Morever, there are no lead effects. The state laws are not changing in advance of the
Circuit precedent.
In other applications, Chen and Yeh (2014a) examine the effects of government
power of eminent domain and finds that it increases economic growth and economic
inequality. Chen and Sethi (2011) examine the effects of sexual harassment law and finds
that pro-plaintiff decisions increase the adoption of sexual harassment human resources
policies and reduce gender inequality in the labor market. Chen and Yeh (2014b)
examine the effects of free speech laws and pairs the analysis with an experiment. We
can decompose the population effects into both an experimental effect of being directly
exposed to the legal change and spillover effects onto those who are not directly affected:
ρ = Experimental TOT direct * P(expdirect) + Spillovers TOT indirect * P(expindirect)
These example analyses are just the core of a broader analytical and data pipeline
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Figure 21: Appellate Impact on State Laws
Source: Chen et al. (2014)
that starts from District Court cases, using the random District judge assignment to
identify the effect of the presence of an appeal.
• District Cases →
• District Judge Bio →
• Circuit Case Appeal 1[Mct > 0] →
• Circuit Judge Bio →
• Circuit Case Decision Lawct→
• Precedential Effects (e.g., State Laws) →
• Promulgation (e.g., News) →
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• Outcomes
Then, the Circuit judge biographies predict the legal decisions, and these have prece-
dential effects. We can look at the promulgation in newspaper reports and subsequent
behavioral outcomes. So far, we have discussed about pro vs. anti decisions, but we
can also use the presence of a case to consider pro vs. no case vs. anti. What I mean is
we can flip a coin, and it can be heads or tails, but we can also wonder what happens
when we did not have a coin flip at all. To put it differently, we might wonder what
society would be like had Roe v. Wade been decided the opposite way, or what society
would be like if Roe v. Wade did not exist as an event.
Now let me discuss briefly on modularity and extensibility. The pipeline above
comes from the laborious hand collection, but one might want to automate the Chicago
Judges Project (Sunstein et al. 2004). For example, a District Court case comes up to
the Circuit Court, and we might want to automatically identify the nearest case. Also,
instead of relying on many years of law students’ hand coding the direction of the case,
we can do fast-decision classification. In a different direction, we might broaden the
question to not just whether there is an effect of the decision–affirm or reverse–but look
at the text itself: Does the dicta matter? Does the reasoning or citation matter? Could
the document embedding or other low-dimensional representation of judicial opinions be
used to characterize a set of policy levers? What about creating deep predictions from
the judicial corpora of how the judges have previously decided? The potential steps
could be as follows: (1) train word2vec, (2) form document embeddings, (3) use deep
IV to identify the direction in the embedding space that is causally related to societal
changes, (4) form k-means clusters in the word2vec space, and (5) report phrases in the
same cluster that are far away from each other along the predictive dimension. These
steps are illustrated in other articles.
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4 Conclusion
Let me end with a note on other prediction projects that employ the 12 terabytes
of collected data. For example, in Supreme Court studies, the benchmark explanatory
models include political ideology and historical voting trends, but we can incorporate
the Circuit Court text, the oral argument text, the audio files, and lawyer biographies.
We can also study the Supreme Court Justices own writings prior to appointment to
the Supreme Court. Through the published decisions of all 26 appellate judges who sat
on at least fifty circuit cases and later served on the Supreme Court from 1946 to 2016,
Ash and Chen (2018) find that a judge who moves from the most Democrat to the most
Republican in precedent and phrase usage is 32 percentage points and 23 percentage
points, respectively, more likely to vote conservative. A judge who moves from the
lowest to highest rank in similarity to Richard Posner and in economics usage is 18
percentage points and 6 percentage points, respectively, more likely to vote conservative.
A judge who moves from the lowest to highest rank in vote polarization and electoral
dissent is 25 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively, more likely to vote
conservative. We can also predict reversals, not just going from Circuit to Supreme
Court, but also from the District to Circuit Courts. A recent study by Caliskan et al.
(2017) showed that word embeddings of the Stanford Internet Corpus reflect human-like
semantic biases. What we can do is to look at the judge’s own past writings and see
if that correlates with their biographies, and when the judges are randomly assigned,
does it impact the decisions? Does it predict sentencing harshness and disparities? Ash
et al. (2018) shows that economic thinking of judges is strongly predictive of sentencing
harshness. The idea that if legal institutions can not catch suspects, then the judge
might increase the sanctions so the expected deterrence is the same.
We can also try to predict re-arrest and prosecutor screening decisions using a
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unique dataset followed from the police arrest report. An algorithm would reduce the
re-arrest rates for a set charge rate. We also find that prosecutors seem to be releasing
defendants throughout the risk distribution. We can also predict ideology, in particular
the political donations of the Supreme Court lawyers, using both their text and their
audio. The audio doubles predictive accuracy relative to the text alone. Motivated
by the error analysis that found the Congo war to vastly help with predictions, we
digitized the Wikileak cables data to predict the asylum grants and claims. Finally, we
can quantitatively assess the oft-stated story that judges, on the record, go so far as to
say that they changed the facts as described from the District Court fact descriptions
to justify a legal change. One of the things we are trying to do is to identify the fact
section vs. the legal section, and then characterize judicial fact discretion, and see
if this is predictive of the reversals of lower court decisions as well as the subsequent
response to these judges.
The legal profession is undergoing a great transformation. The tools of machine
learning and causal inference can be used to study, predict, and respond to normative
judgments. In this article, I discuss how these tools can assess extra-legal factors that
predict judicial decisions and how these predictions can be used to measure the causal
impacts of judicial decisions.
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